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Abstract
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are a family of embedded devices
used for physical process control. Similar to other embedded devices, PLCs
are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Because they are used to control the physical
processes of critical infrastructures, compromised PLCs constitute a significant
security and safety risk. In this paper, we investigate attacks against PLCs by
introducing a specific type of attack against a PLC that allows the adversary
to stealthily manipulate the physical process it controls by tampering with the
device I/O at a low level. We implemented two variant of the attack in the form
of a rootkit and a user-space malicious code over a candidate PLC. However in
this technical edition we do not include the design information of the rootkit or
the user-space malicious software. Our study is meant to be used as a basis for
the design of more robust detection techniques specifically tailored for PLCs.
1 A New Kind of Attack
In this section, we describe a new type of attack that targets PLCs. PLCs
are embedded devices that are sensitive components of critical infrastructures
and are used in various industrial environments to control physical processes.
Because of the manner in which PLCs operate, we have identified new possible
means for attackers to exploit them.
We assume one of the main goals to attack a PLC is to manipulate the
physical process by sending signals to the sensors and actuators controlled by the
PLC, while simultaneously remaining undetectable to the PLC logic, firmware,
and its operators. Physical process manipulation can have serious consequences
for the safety of equipment and human life. For example, an adversary may
manipulate the value of tank pressure sensors in a pressure sensitive boiler
thus leading to the explosion of the boiler, or, similarly to Stuxnet, change
the frequency of variable speed drives of centrifuges in a uranium enrichment
facility, leading to damage of the centrifuge cascades.
The novelty of our attack lies in the fact that to manipulate the physical
process like others [4,5,9,24,25,39], we do not modify the PLC logic instructions
or firmware. Instead, we target the interaction between the firmware and the
PLC I/O.
This can be achieved without leveraging traditional function hooking tech-
niques and by placing the entire malicious code in dynamic memory, thus cir-
cumventing detection mechanisms such as Autoscopy Jr. and Doppelganger.
Additionally, the attack causes the PLC firmware to assume that it is interact-
ing effectively with the I/O while, in reality, the connection between the I/O
and the PLC process is being manipulated.
1.1 PLC operation
The main components of a PLC firmware is a software called runtime. The run-
time software interprets or executes another code (or executable) known as the
logic. The logic is a compiled form of the PLC’s programming language, such
as function blocks or ladder logic. Ladder Logic and Function Block Diagrams
are graphical programming languages that describe the control process. A plant
operator programs the logic and can change it when required. The logic is dy-
namic code, whereas the runtime software is static code. The purpose of a PLC
is to control equipment, and to do so, it must interact with its I/O. The first
requirement for I/O interaction is to map the physical I/O addresses into mem-
ory. The drivers or PLC runtime map the I/O memory ranges. Additionally, at
the beginning of logic execution, the PLC runtime software must initialize the
processor registers related to the I/O used in the logic. During the initialization,
the appropriate modes for the I/O are set by the runtime software.
For example, it sets the “output” mode for I/O pins that are used for write
operations in the logic or the “input” mode for I/O pins that are used for read
operations in the logic. This stage is called the I/O initialization sequence.
After I/O initialization, the PLC runtime software executes the logic in every
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Figure 1: Overview of PLC runtime operation, the PLC logic and its interaction
with the physical I/O memory
run cycle. In an ideal scenario, we can assume that the PLC prepares the logic
execution by scanning the logic inputs (e.g., the I/O inputs that are used in
the logic) and the set points from the variable table. The variable table is a
virtual table that contains all set points and input or output variables used
within the logic. The operation that consists of reading the inputs, executing
the logic code, and updating the outputs is called the program scan. During the
program scan, any changes in the variable table (for the I/O inputs) are ignored
until the beginning of the next program scan. At the end of the program scan,
the PLC runtime software writes to the related part of the mapped memory
that eventually is written to the physical I/O by the kernel. Figure 1 depicts
the PLC runtime operation, the running of the logic, and its interaction with
the I/O.
At hardware level, a PLC typically comprises separate digital and analog
inputs and outputs. Because PLCs, similar to other computers, are digital
systems, they cannot control analog input and output without additional hard-
ware components. Digital-to-Analog Converters (DACs) for analog outputs and
Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) for analog inputs form part of the analog
interface of a PLC. These components read or write analog values by converting
them to or from digital outputs or inputs to allow the PLC to interact with
its analog interfaces. The DACs and ADCs are not separate components of
the PLC but rather an integral part of the PLC circuit board. One can argue
that the basis of I/O interaction in PLCs is digital. Analog control is simply
a conversion of digital signals into analog signals or analog signals into digital
signals.
1.2 I/O attack
We assume that to perform the I/O attack, the attacker can gain root access to
the targeted device. This can be achieved through firmware verification attacks,
through control-flow attacks against the PLC runtime, or by guessing default
passwords. By installing rogue firmware into the PLC, the attacker can infect
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Figure 2: Steps of the I/O attack for read and write manipulation
every binary in the PLC. This can give the attacker complete leverage over
the PLC operating system. Using a control-flow attack, the attacker can gain
access at the same level as the PLC process. Previous research has revealed
that various PLCs run their runtime software as the root user by default [5,13].
In the case that the PLC runtime is vulnerable to control-flow attack but
is not running as root, the attacker needs a privilege escalation vulnerability to
gain root access to the PLC.
Regarding default passwords, several reported vulnerabilities suggest that
some vulnerable PLCs have default root passwords [6, 14]. An attacker can log
in to such a device using the default root password to execute his attack.
In addition to the root access requirement, in case the host OS does not
provide the physical I/O addresses of the drivers (e.g. via /proc/modules), the
attacker needs to know the CPU version of the PLC to investigate it and obtain
the physical memory locations for the I/O.
We assume that the attacker already knows the physical process and is aware
of the mapping between the I/O pins and the logic. The PLC logic might use
various inputs and outputs to control its process; thus, the attacker must know
which input or output must be modified to affect the process as desired. The
work presented by McLaughlin et al. [24,25] can be used to discover the mapping
between the different I/O variables and the physical world.
The objective of an I/O attack is not merely to manipulate the I/O, but
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rather to tamper with the I/O in a stealthy manner that does not use typical
rootkit techniques. To execute our I/O attack, we must be able to intercept the
I/O read or write operations. If we were to use conventional function hooking
techniques, most Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) mechanisms would be able to
detect our attempts. Therefore, we designed our attack such that it does not
use typical function hooking techniques, but can intercept read or write oper-
ations. We use the processor debug registers for our attack. Debug registers
were introduced to assist developers in analyzing their software, and all new
processors with various different architectures (ARM, Intel, and MIPS) have
such registers. These registers allow us to set hardware breakpoints to specific
memory addresses. Once an address that is in the debug register is accessed
by a process, the processor interrupt handler is called and runs a customized
interrupt handler.
As the first stage of our attack, we set the mapped I/O addresses to the debug
register and intercept every write or read operation using them. In the second
stage of our attack, we exploit the I/O initialization sequence. Every I/O, before
being used by an application, must be initialized. One step of this initialization
process is to define the input/output state of the I/O. If a program wants to use
a specific pin in the I/O, it must declare its input/output state to the processor.
We manipulate this initialization sequence in our I/O attack to change the state
of the I/O at runtime whenever the system performs a read/write operation. By
intercepting read/write operations using debug registers and manipulating the
I/O initialization sequence, an attacker can manipulate the I/O without using
any conventional function hooking technique (i.e., code or data hooking) and
without being detected by current host-based solutions for embedded devices.
Additionally, the attacker does not need to manipulate the PLC system sta-
tus reports that are being sent to the SCADA software because even the PLC
runtime software itself is not be aware of the I/O manipulation.
The attacker first intercepts the write and read operations of the I/O by
inserting his desired addresses into the debug registers of the processor. As
described earlier, this allows the attacker to intercept the read/write operations
and to call his own interrupt handler after interception. When the PLC runtime
software wants to read from or write to the I/O, the processor halts the process
and calls the attacker interrupt handler. Depending on the type of runtime
operation (i.e., read or write) being performed in the I/O, the attacker can
decide how to proceed as follows:
1. For write operations: If the PLC runtime software is attempting to write
a value to an I/O pin that is initialized as output, the attacker can reini-
tialize the I/O pin in an input state and allows the runtime software to
continue its operation. The runtime software then attempts to execute
its write operation to the I/O pin, which has been reinitialized as input.
However, the processor ignores such write operations to the I/O because
the I/O has been reinitialized in input mode. Figure 2 depicts the manip-
ulation of write and read operations in an I/O attack.
2. For read operations: When the PLC runtime software is attempting to
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read a value from an I/O pin that is initialized as input, the attacker can
reinitialize the I/O pin as an output pin, allowing him to write the value
that he wishes to feed to the PLC runtime software into the reinitialized
I/O pin. The attacker can then either switch the state of the pin to input
mode or allow the runtime software to read the value from an output-mode
pin.
Under an I/O attack, the PLC runtime reads the values desired by the
attacker from the I/O. The runtime software is not able to write to the I/O;
instead, the attacker writes his desired values.
In our lab, we implemented two variants of this attack in a form of a PLC
rootkit and a user-mode malicious application. Due to internal restrictions, we
do not release the implementation details of the attack. However, we are willing
to describe the performance detail of the first implementation. The second im-
plementation (malicious user-mode application) had no significant performance
overhead.
2 Discussions
2.1 Performance
Embedded devices typically have limited resources for the operations they ex-
ecute. This is the case for PLCs as well. While in general, embedded devices
performance overhead is not an issue for the attacker, it can be when a PLC
controls processes that are timely critical. If in such processes the performance
overhead causes significant delay in the I/O speed, it can uncover the attack. We
evaluated the performance of the first variant of the I/O attack (rootkit variant)
on our selected hardware (Raspberry Pi model 1 B). In the second variant of
the attack implementation the performance overhead was not significant (only
2%). Regarding CPU overhead for the first implementation (rootkit), based
on our evaluation, an I/O attack on average incurs 5% CPU overhead for the
manipulation of write operations and 23% CPU overhead for the manipulation
of read operations. Read operation manipulation imposes a higher CPU load
for two reasons. First, the PLC runtime environment reads the values from the
I/O multiple times per second, thereby significantly increasing the CPU over-
head, whereas for write operations, the number of I/O write operations depends
only on the logic (in our case, every five seconds). Second, read manipulation
requires two instructions (setting the pin to output mode and writing to it),
whereas write manipulation requires only one instruction (setting the pin to
input mode).
Figure 3 depicts the CPU overhead incurred by the manipulation of read
and write operations in an I/O attack. The additional CPU overhead is not
an important concern for the attacker, but it creates anomalies in the power
consumption of the victimized device.
To understand the impact of an I/O attack on control operations, we eval-
uated the I/O speed fluctuations in our selected setup (Raspberry Pi with
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Figure 3: CPU overhead in an I/O attack
Codesys runtime running our sample logic). Figure 4 depicts the fluctuation
of the I/O speed with and without our rootkit implementation. On average the
speed where our hardware could write to the I/O (without our rootkit) was 3.97
milliseconds. When the rootkit manipulates the I/O (intercept the I/O write
operation and write the same value), the average speed of the I/O increased to
4.01 milliseconds.
The difference in I/O speed with and without rootkit is insignificant. Addi-
tionally, in a normal state (no rootkit operating), the I/O speed has a similar
fluctuation to when our rootkit is executing an I/O attack.
2.2 Hardware Knowledge
In our rootkit implementation, we had knowledge of all physical I/O register
addresses. However, this is not the case for all types of processors. For example,
certain PLC processors are proprietary. In this case, an attacker needs to per-
form the additional step of determining the physical addresses of the I/O pins
of his interest. However, this necessity does not stop state-sponsored attack-
ers. Detecting the I/O addresses that are used in either drivers or applications
is straightforward. Unix-based operating systems provide I/O address ranges
in /proc/modules for kernel drivers or in /proc/$pid/maps (where $pid is the
PLC runtime process ID) for applications for I/O mapping. Nevertheless, de-
tecting the I/O register addresses is a complicated task. Again, attackers who
wish to target PLCs to attack critical infrastructures will investigate their tar-
gets sufficiently to determine this information. One solution for obtaining this
I/O register information is to first decompile the available PLC logic within
the PLC memory and search for I/O read/write operations and then monitor
the read/write operations involving the mapped addresses retrieved from the
OS (e.g., /proc/modules or /proc/$pid/maps). An attacker can begin looking
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for the I/O input/output mode registers by monitoring the PLC runtime en-
vironment when it is starting up. Additionally, from the decompiled logic, the
attacker can be aware of the timing of the cycle of read and write operations
in a specified I/O memory range. By monitoring read/write operations in that
memory area (e.g., using debug registers), the attacker can identify the I/O
read/write registers.
2.3 Possibility for Race Condition
There is a small chance that a race condition happens during the read manip-
ulation of the I/O. For example, assume that we have a sensor connected to an
input enabled pin in the PLC. If this sensor updates the value of the pin right
after the rootkit does, then the PLC runtime reads the actual value of the I/O
instead of the attackers intended value. This race condition can lead to a failure
in the read manipulation operation of the I/O attack.
3 Conclusions and Future Work
In our research we have proposed a new type of attack that leverages the weak-
nesses in design and we understood that the attack can be used by adversaries to
manipulate the physical process in a way that the PLC runtime and the SCADA
applications are unaware of the manipulation. This makes the attack interest-
ing and relevant since current detection techniques are not effective against this
new type of attack.
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